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IMPLAUSIBLE INJURIES: WAL-MART V. DUKES AND 
THE FUTURE OF CLASS ACTIONS AND 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASES 
Marcia L. McCormick* 
INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court's decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes1 
has broad implications for the future of class actions, particularly 
when the defendant's state of mind matters to the claim or when the 
case involves potentially complicated questions of causation. Moreo-
ver, when the decision is combined with the Court's recent decisions 
regarding pleading requirements, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twomb/y2 and 
Ashcroft v. lqbal,3 and judges' views on how people behave, the future 
of class actions seems very uncertain. The Court has invited lower 
court judges to consider what kinds of legal wrongs they think people 
are likely to engage in and to focus on what makes members of a 
putative class different rather than what makes them alike. That invi-
tation will inevitably result jn fewer class actions and may make it 
impossible to bring class actions for some types of cJaims. 
II. RULE 23 AND WAL-MART V. DUKES 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 governs class actions. It pro-
vides that a class action can be maintained if a party, or more than 
one, meets certain prerequisites and if the claims raised fit one of 
three prescribed models.4 If the parties seeking class certification fail 
at either step, that class cannot be certified.' 
The prerequisites are laid out in rule 23(a), and require that 
(1) the class [be] so numerous that joinder of all members is 
impracticable; 
• Associate Professor, Saint Louis University School or Law. 
1. Wal·Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). 
2. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, SSO U.S. 544 (2007). In Twombly, the Court heightened the 
pleading standard laid out in Federal Ruic of Civil Procedure 8 by requiring that a complaint set 
forth "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face," but denied that this 
required "heightened fact pleading of specifics." Id. at 570. 
3. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
4. See FED. R. C1v. P. 23(a)-(b). 
5. See FED. R. C1v. P. 23(a)-(b). 
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(2) there (be] questions of law or fact common to the class; 
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties [be] typi-
cal of the claims or defenses of the class; and 
(4) the representative parties [be able to) fairly and adequately 
protect the interests of the class.6 
These requirements have been given the shorthand of numerosity, 
commonality, typicality, and adequacy.7 
Once the parties meet the prerequisites, they must show that one of 
the conditions set out in 23(b) is satisfied-essentially that the claim 
fits into one of the listed models. The class may proceed if pursuing 
the actions separately would result in varied judgments that could es-
tablish incompatible standards of conduct for the defendant or would 
affect the interests of parties that are not part of the action.8 Alterna-
tively, if the defendant acted in a way that applies generally to the 
class so that injunctive or declaratory relief is appropriate, the parties 
can proceed as a class.9 Finally, the class can be certified if the ques-
tions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any 
questions affecting only individual members.10 
A. Background 
The Dukes litigation was initiated by the Impact Fund, a nonprofit 
legal organization that provides support for litigation that is brought 
to advance economic and social justice.11 It sought to change the 
working culture at Wal-Mart,12 the country's largest private em-
ployer.13 A class claim was the only way to do so. The case began in 
2001 when Betty Dukes and five other women sued Wal-Mart for sex 
discrimination in pay, promotions to salaried management positions, 
and job assignments.14 The plaintiffs sought to represent a class of all 
women employed by Wal-Mart or who had worked for the company 
since 1998 and been subjected to Wal~Mart's policies.15 The plaintiffs 
presented evidence that Wal-Mart had no formal policies on promo-
tion beyond the hourly-paid department manager positions, rates of 
6. FED. R. Cav. P. 23(a). 
1. Su Wal-Marl Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2SSO (2011). 
8. FED. R. C1v. P. 23(b)(1). 
9. FED. R. Cav. P. 23(b)(2). 
10. FED. R. Cav. P. 23(b)(3). 
11. About Us, IMPACT FUND, http://www.impactfund.org/inde".php?caUd=4 (last visited Mar. 
4, 2013). 
12. Su Impact Fund Casts, IMPACf FUND, http://www.impactfund.org/index.php7cat_id=95 
(la.st visited Mar. 4, 2013). 
13. Wal·Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct 2541, 2547 (2011). 
14. Su id. at 2547-48. 
IS. Id. at 2548-49. 
2013] IMPLAUSIBLE INJURIES 713 
pay within a range, or job assignments; rather, Wal-Mart left decisions 
to the discretion of individual managers and provided no information 
to the employees on how pay, promotion, or job assignments would be 
determined.16 At the same time, the company maintained a very 
strong corporate culture that promoted many traditional social values, 
including values about gender roles, and there was evidence that gen-
der stereotypes permeated the company at all levels.17 The plaintiffs 
alleged that this combination allowed gender stereotypes to operate 
and influence employment decisions, resulting in a gender pay gap 
across all regions in the company's stores and at every pay level, as 
well as a gender gap in promotions-well over two-thirds of employ-
ees eligible for promotion were women, but only about one-third were 
in management.18 The plaintiff class sought injunctive relief related to 
Wal-Mart's promotion and pay policies and also sought backpay for 
the class. 
The district court certified the class for the pay and promotion 
claims,19 and the Ninth Circuit, with some small variations on the defi-
nition of the class, affirmed.20 The Ninth Circuit affirmed again sitting 
en banc,21 with five judges dissenting on the ground that, essentially, 
such a large putative class made the case too complex to certify.22 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on two issues: (1) whether 
the putative class satisfied the commonality requirement of Rule 
23(a)(2) and (2) whether the relief sought and the theory of the case 
brought the class within the limits of Rule 23(b)(2). Rule 23(b)(2) 
requires that "the party opposing the class ha[ve] acted or refused to 
act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive 
relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the 
class as a whole." 
16. See id. at 2553-56; see also id. at 2563-64 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part); Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 145-66 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (recounting 
and analyzing the "extensive" evidence of commonality). 
17. See Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2563-64 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); 
Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 152- 53. But see Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2548, 2553- 56 (characterizing the 
claim about a strong corporate culture as a theory rather than as ract, and rejecting the other 
evidence as insufficient to prove that the strong culture combined with delegated, unguided dis· 
cretion could lead to widespread discrimination). 
18. Ste Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 146, lSS. 
19. Id. at 173. 
20. A three-judge panel issued one opinion, Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 474 F.3d 1214 (9th Cir. 
2007), then withdrew it DOd issued another opinion, Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 509 F.3d 1168 (9th 
Cir. 2007). 
21. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 620-23 (9th Cir. 2010) (en bane) (rejecting 
class certification on plaintiffs' claims for punitive damages and removing Crom the class women 
who did not work for Wal-Mart at the time the complaint was filed). 
22. Ste id. at 628 (Ikuta, J., dissenting); id. at 652 (Kozinski, J .. dissenting). 
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In the Supreme Court, the plaintiffs argued that they had shown 
that the class met Rule 23{a)(2)'s commonality requirement by show-
ing that members of the class were all injured by discrimination 
against women caused by Wal-Mart's policies and culture.23 To sup-
port their arguments, the plaintiffs provided evidence from three ex-
perts. First, a statistician analyzed pay and personnel data; 
documented the gender gap within stores, and across stores, regions, 
and positions; and demonstrated that the gap could not be caused by 
neutral factors.24 Second, a labor economist documented the gender 
gap in management at Wal-Mart compared to its competitors, and his 
statistical analysis demonstrated that the gender gap could not be due 
to chance.25 And third, a sociologist analyzed Wal-Mart's personnel 
practices and culture, and explained how the unfettered discretion and 
strong corporate culture could allow discrimination to operate.26 
In addition to the statistical and social science evidence, the plain-
tiffs provided anecdotal evidence of several incidents in which deci-
sions were made on the basis of gender, or comments or actions by 
management revealed that gender stereotypes permeated their think-
ing.27 The plaintiffs also argued that because the relief they sought 
was primarily equitable-backpay has traditionally been considered a 
form of equitable rather than legal relief28-injunctive relief prevailed 
over the monetary relief sought, and thus the class could be certified 
under Rule 23(b)(2).29 
Wal-Mart's defense disputed both the 23(a)(2} and 23(b)(2) issues. 
Regarding 23(a)(2)'s commonality requirement, Wal-Mart focused 
primarily on the admissibility and validity of expert testimony.Jo Wal· 
Mart further argued that the class lacked commonality because not 
every woman in the class was affected the same way (or maybe at all} 
by the promotion, pay, and job assignment policies.31 The defense 
emphasized the complexity of the case: the sheer size of the class 
23. Wal·Marl Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Cl. 2541, 2548 (2011). 
24. Stt id. at 2549, 2555. 
25. Stt id. 
26. Ste id. at 2549, 2553. 
27. Id. at 2556; id. at 2563-64 (Ginsburi:. J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
28. Stt Great· West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 230 (2002) (Ginsburg, 
J., dissenting); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 40!5, 416-17 (1975) (characlcrizing 
backpay as equilablc, but not deciding that ii is). Bue stt Grtat·Wtsl Lift, !534 U.S. at 218-19 n.4 
(concluding that the language of Title VII did not necessarily characterize backpay as equitable 
relief). 
29. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2559-61. 
30. Set id. al 2549. 
31. Stt Brie( for Pelitioner at 8-13, 16-23, Wal·Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 
(2011) (No. 10·277). 
2013) IMPLAUSIBLE INJURIES 715 
(somewhere between 500,000 and 1.5 million women), the large num-
ber of stores, the different types of stores, the large number of depart-
ments, the large number of job classifications, and the number of 
potential nondiscriminatory reasons that could have been considered 
in making these decisions.J2 Wal-Mart also argued against certifica-
tion under Rule 23(b)(2), stating that because backpay was sought for 
the class, monetary relief predominated over injunctive relief.33 
The Supreme Court essentially agreed with Wal-Mart and the dis-
senting judges from the Ninth Circuit and reversed the certification of 
the class.34 All nine of the justices thought that certification of the 
class was improper under Rule 23(b)(2), holding that backpay claims 
of the class members qualified as monetary relief and would 
predominate over the injunctive relief sought.35 On the question of 
commonality under Rule 23(a)(2), the split was five-to-four along the 
expected ideological lines: Justice Scalia, with Justices Alito, Kennedy, 
Thomas, and Chief Justice Roberts were in the majority; Justices Gins-
burg, Breyer, Kagan, and Sotomayor dissented. 
B. Commonality 
On the Rule 23(a)(2) issue, the Court reversed the certification en-
tirely, holding that the putative class failed to meet the commonality 
requirement of Rule 23(a)(2).36 That rule requires a party seeking 
class certification to prove that there are "questions of Jaw or fact 
common to the class."37 The majority reasoned that the claims must 
"depend upon a common contention" that, once decided, "will resolve 
an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one 
32. Id. at 3, 5~, 10-13, 26-29, 39-41. 
33. Stt id. DI 46-55. 
34. Stt Duku, 131 S. Ct. at 2557~1. 
35. In the unanimous portion of the opinion, the Court held that claims for monetary relief 
may not be certified under Rule 23(b)(2), at least when the monetary relief was not incidental to 
the requested injunctive or declaratory relief. See id. at 2SS7. And because Wal·Mart was enti-
tled to individualized determinotions of each employee's eligibility for backpay, those claims 
were not incidental to the reques1cd injunctive or declara1ory relief in this case. Stt id. at 2557, 
2560-61. Based on the Rule's hislory and structure, the Court held, Ruic 23(b)(2) applies only 
when a single, indivisible remedy would provide relief to each class member, and issues of pre-
dominance do nol apply. Ste id. at 2557-59. Individualized monetary claims belong instead in 
Ruic 23(b)(3). which provides extra procedural protections for class members. Set id. at 
2558-59. The Court declined to decide whether monetary claims can ever be certified under 
23(b)(2). See id. at 2557. The dissent would have remanded to allow the district court to deter-
mine whether the class could be certified under Ruic 23(b)(3). See id. at 2561~2 (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
36. Id. at 2556-57 (majority opinion). 
37. Set id. at 2550-51. 
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stroke."38 The majority further held that plaintiffs in a class action 
need "significant proof' of commonality and, because proof of com-
monality necessarily overlaps with proof of the merits of the plaintiffs' 
claim, they must also have significant proof of their claim.39 
Here, the claim alleged that Wal-Mart engaged in a pattern or prac-
tice of discrimination. In the majority's view, discrimination claims 
require an inquiry into the reasons for particular employment deci-
sions; in this action, the plaintiffs were essentially suing for millions of 
employment decisions.40 A common question required there to be 
some element that held together the alleged reasons for those deci-
sions, and the majority reasoned that the plaintiffs needed significant 
proof that this unifying element was a general, corporate-wide policy 
of discrimination.41 A general policy driving the individual decisions 
was the only way that the majority saw to either link those decisions 
sufficiently as having a common cause or to hold the business entity 
responsible for those decisions. 
The majority then found that the plaintiffs had failed to provide 
sufficient proof through their expert testimony and the anecdotal evi-
dence.42 Because Wal-Mart had a written policy that prohibited dis-
crimination, the Court found that it undermined any inference that 
the company had engaged in pattern or practice of discrimination.43 
Moreover, other evidence of a pattern or practice of discrimination 
also failed to show commonality through a de facto policy.44 
Although it did not cite to Twombly or Iqbal, the majority seemed 
to draw very heavily upon the notion of plausibility in analyzing 
whether the evidence demonstrated commonality.4s The majority rea-
soned that the expert testimony that Wal-Mart's corporate culture was 
vulnerable to gender bias-that it was possible-did not show that the 
employment decisions at issue were caused by gender bias-that it was 
proven true or at least probable.46 The majority further reasoned that 
in a company of Wal-Mart's size and geographical scope, it is unlikely 
that all managers would exercise their discretion in a common way 
without some common, specific direction.47 
38. Id. at 2551. 
39. Set! id. at 2551-53. 
40. See Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2554-55; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). 
41. Set Duku, 131 S. Ct. at 2553. 
42. See id. at 25~57. 
43. Id. at 2554-55. 
44. See id. at 25SS-57. 
45. Cf. id. at 2554-56. 
46. See id. at 2553-54. 
47. Duku, 131 S. Ct. at 2SSS. 
2013] IMPLAUSIBLE INJURIES 717 
On this point, the majority's worldview and assumptions about be-
havior proved central to its conclusions about what was plausible. The 
majority reasoned that it would be difficult to prove commonality 
when a company's official policy was for individual decision makers to 
exercise their discretion, stating that "left to their own devices most 
managers in any corporation-and surely most managers in a corpora-
tion that forbids sex discrimination-would select sex-neutral, per-
formance-based criteria for hiring and promotion that produce no 
actionable disparity at all," even if some would select criteria that 
cause a disparate impact and some would use sex to decide.48 Simi-
larly, the statistical proof of pay disparities on a regional or national 
level could not be used to prove that those same disparities existed 
equally at the store level at which the pay decisions were made.49 Ad-
ditionally, the anecdotal evidence was too sparse for the size of the 
class.so 
The dissent disagreed with this view of the evidence. The dissent 
believed that the evidence showed a distinctive pattern of discrimina-
tory decision making. The sociologist had shown how the policy of 
discretion, combined with the strong corporate culture and the high 
level of gender stereotyping, made sex discrimination possible. The 
statistician and the labor economist showed how this discrimination 
played out in a pattern of pay and promotion disparities, including at 
the store level.51 The anecdotal evidence gave life to the numbers by 
providing evidence of how individual supervisors made their deci-
sions. 52 In this way. each type of evidence built on the other to show 
all together how discretion could produce the promotional and pay 
disparities observed. 
The dissent also criticized the majority for ignoring prior class ac-
tion decisions and for effectively revisiting facts the district court had 
found. The dissent sharply criticized the majority for importing a "dis-
similarities" approach from 23(b)(3) into the issue of commonality 
under 23(a)(2).53 The requirements of Rule 23(a) were meant to es-
tablish a threshold by articulating criteria necessary to, but not suffi-
cient for certification.54 On the other ltand, the rules in 23(b) were 
designed to provide the rules for sufficiency, along with procedural 
48. Id. at 2554. 
49. Stt id. at 2SSS-S6. 
SO. Id. at 2556. 
51. Ste id. at 2563-65 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
52. Ste id. at 2563-64. 
53. Dukt.s, 131 S. Ct. at 2565-67. 
54. Stt id. at 2566. 
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protections for different types of classes.ss It was this dissimilarities 
approach that allowed the majority to focus on what divided members 
of the class rather than on what united them, thereby magnifying the 
former to the point that they eclipsed the latter.56 
The Court's analysis in Dukes is highly puzzling as a doctrinal mat-
ter, with regard to both the law governing class actions and the law of 
employment discrimination. While the Court recited rules from its 
prior cases that governed the task of district courts in deciding 
whether to certify a class, it never acknowledged its own standard of 
review over such a decision. This omission is a serious one. The 
Court noted, "Rule 23 does not set forth a mere pleading standard. A 
party seeking class certification must affirmatively demonstrate his 
compliance with the Rule-that is, he must be prepared to prove that 
there are in far;t sufficiently numerous parties, common questions of 
law or fact, etc."'' 
This description sounds as if the party seeking certification must 
prove a fact, which would make the court's conclusion on that issue a 
finding of fact. Findings of fact are usually subject to review under the 
highly deferential "clearly erroneous" standard, yet the Court appears 
to have weighed the evidence and come to a conclusion different from 
that of the district court, essentially finding that the plaintiffs' descrip-
tion of how the class suffered a common injury was not believable-
that is, not plausible. 
III. WHAT DUKES TELLS Us ABOUT PLAUSIBILITY 
Plausibility is currently a hot topic in civil procedure circles after the 
Court reframed the definition of Rule 8 to embody a plausibility stan-
dard. Before Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, the Supreme Court had 
used plausibility substantively in an antitrust case when it described 
what a court should do when reviewing a summary judgment mo-
tion.58 When the Supreme Court issued its decision in Twombly, it 
changed the general standard for evaluating the sufficiency of com-
plaints in federal court by adding a requirement of plausibility, spark-
ing a debate that focused on· what exactly "plausible" meant in this 
context.59 The consensus was that it could not mean any sort of fac-
SS. See id. 
S6. Id. at 2S6S-07. 
57. Id. at 2SS1 (majority opinion). 
58. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith R<1dio Corp .. 475 U.S. S74 (1986); ue also Ed· 
ward Brunet, The Subsranrive Origins of ''Pla11sible Pleadings": An Introduction ro the Sympo· 
sium on Ashcroft v. Iqbal. 14 LEWIS & Ct.ARK L. REv. l, 10 (2010). 
59. See, e.g., Symposium, Pondering Iqbal, 14 LEw1s & CLARK L. Rev. 1 (2010). 
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tual plausibility, that it must instead mean legal plausibility because 
the job of the court at the pleadings stage is to make a decision based 
only on the legal questions presented.60 
A complaint is supposed to be a short, plain statement of the 
grounds for the court's jurisdiction; a short, plain statement of the 
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and a demand for 
relief.61 A complaint is designed to give defendants "fair notice" of 
the claims against them-what injury the plaintiffs have suffered and 
what entitles them to the relief they seek.62 A motion to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim, then, asks whether plaintiffs are entitled to 
offer evidence to support their claims, that is, whether the law would 
provide relief for the conduct and injury described.63 The standard is 
a question of the legal sufficiency of the complaint, not an assessment 
of whether the facts alleged are likely to be true.64 
Despite this relative clarity, in theory, that plausibility must mean 
legal rather than factual plausibility, when the Court applied Twombly 
in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the allegation found implausible sounded like a 
question concerning facts: whether Attorney General John Ashcroft 
was plausibly the architect of a policy to detain Arab Muslims because 
of their ethnicity and religion.65 The Court found that this motive was 
not plausible, that the result of the detention of Arab Muslims could 
have been caused by the impact of a nondiscriminatory policy de-
signed to preserve the security of the nation, and that this scenario 
was actually more plausible than that alleged by the plaintiff. 66 
In reaching this conclusion, the Court paraphrased the holding in 
Twombly, stating that "[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plain-
tiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged."67 
The Court continued, quoting Twombly, "Where a complaint pleads 
facts that are merely consistent with a defendant's liability, it stops 
short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to 
60. Cf. Bell At!. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, SSS (2007) (holding that courts must take the 
factual allegations in the complaint as true however "doubtful in fact" they are). 
61. FED. R. C1v. P. 8(a); see also Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). 
62. See, e.g .• Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002). 
63. Su Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). 
64. See Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 508 n.l;see also Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989) 
("What Rule 12(b)(6) docs not countenance arc dismissals based on a judge's disbelief of a 
complaint's factual allegations."). 
65. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 682 (2009). 
66. Id. at 680-82. 
67. Id. at 678 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 
544, 556 (2007)). 
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relief."68 In other words. the Court seemed to hold that where infer-
ences from the facts alleged could support two different interpreta-
tions-one that would give rise to relief and one that would not-a 
court should accept the interpretation that would not give rise to relief 
if it found that such an interpretation was plausible. 
Applying these rules to the complaint. the majority refused to ac-
cept the allegations in the complaint as true that Attorney General 
Ashcroft and FBI Director Robert Mueller knew of. condoned, and 
agreed to subject the plaintiff to harsh conditions of confinement 
solely because of his religion, race, and national origin. rather than for 
a legitimate penological interest; that Ashcroft was the principal archi-
tect of the policy; or that Mueller was instrumental in adopting and 
enforcing it.69 According to the Court, these allegations were too con-
clusory.70 The Court stated that the remaining allegations, "[t]aken as 
true ... are consistent with petitioners' purposefully designating de-
tainees 'of high interest' because of their race. religion, or national 
origin. But given more likely explanations, they do not plausibly estab-
lish this purpose ... 11 In other words. the Court did not believe the 
assertion of the defendant>s motive in the complaint, and, because im-
proper motive was an element of the underlying claim. the Court held 
that it did not have to accept that allegation as true.n 
The Court distinguished between facts that are well-pleaded and 
those that are conclusory and thus not really facts, but something 
more like a conclusion about the law-a "formulaic recitation of the 
elements" of the underlying claim.73 But this distinction seems unsat-
isfactory when the Court ultimately appeared to say that it did not 
believe that the defendants would act the way that the plaintiffs al-
leged they had acted. 
To be sure, part of the problem is caused by the muddled distinction 
between facts and law.74 For purposes of allocating decisions between 
juries and judges, and between trial courts and appellate courts. the 
legal system makes distinctions between what are questions of law and 
what are questions of fact. 75 The distinction, though appealing and 
68. Id. (citing Twombly, SSO U.S. at 557). 
69. Id. at 680-81. 
70. Id. at 681. 
71. Iqbal, SS6 U.S. at 681 (emphasis added). 
72. Id. at 680-82. 
73. Id. at 680-81. 
74. Su Rakesh N. Kilaru, Comment, The New Rule 12(b)(6): Twombly, Iqba~ and rhe Para· 
dox of Pleading, 62 STAN. L. REV. 905, 914-16, 924-29 (2010). 
75. See Ronald 1. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Myrh of rhe l.aw-Facr Distincrion, 97 Nw. U. 
L. REv. 1769, 1769 (2003) ("SignifK:ant consequences attach to whether an issue is labeled 'legal' 
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firmly entrenched, is quite fuzzy in the details, to the point that we 
recognize many areas of "mixed" questions in which rules or stan-
dards are applied to underlying events. 76 And when elements of a 
claim are described, they are termed "ultimate facts," or facts essen-
tial to the claim or a defense,77 which means they are conclusions that 
the trier of fact must reach through consideration of both the facts 
most directly shown by the evidence and the inferences that may be 
drawn from those facts. 
Thus, it seems that plausibility has a factual implication. The courts 
are allowed to ask whether the plaintiffs allegations are believable, 
which implicitly invites the judges to ask whether they believe the alle-
gations.78 The decision in Dukes seems to take this notion one step 
further. Not only can courts consider the plausibility of inferences 
when evaluating a complaint for sufficiency, they can also use plausi-
bility to reweigh the facts that support class certification. Therefore, 
one possible consequence of the Dukes decision is evisceration of the 
formerly deferential standard of review for certification decisions by 
district courts. 
It is possible, though, that the Dukes Court would disagree that it 
reweighed facts found by the district court. Perhaps the majority be-
lieved that they were instead interpreting the law of employment dis-
crimination and explaining as a matter of law what it means for an 
employer to engage in a pattern or practice of discrimination. Edward 
Brunet has contended, based on the substantive use of plausibility in 
Matsushita Electrical Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., that sub-
stantive law can "limit[ ] the range of permissible inferences from am-
biguous evidence."79 This may "empower judges with a substantive 
ability to fashion new norms by reconsidering factual inferences; with 
good reasons a judge can change a denial or grant of summary judg-
or •rac1ua1'-whether a judge or jury will decide the issue; if, and under what standard, there will 
be appellate review; whether the issue is subject to evidence and discovery rules; whether proce· 
dural devices such as burdens of proof apply; and whether the decision has preccdentiol value."). 
76. Id. at 1778-79. 
77. See BLAcK's L"w DrCTIONARY 671 (9th ed. 2009). 
78. See Iqbal, SS6 U.S. at 679 ("Determining whether a complaint states 11 plausible claim for 
relief will ... be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 
experience and common sense."); see a/so Tung Yin,"/ Do Not Think /Implausible/ Means What 
You Think It Mearu": Iqbal v. Ashcroft and Judicial Vouching for Government Officials, 14 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 203, 212 (2010). See generally Suja A. Thomas, The Fallacy of Disposi· 
tive Procedure, SO B.C. L. REv. 759 (2009). Importantly, for the motion to dismiss stage, the 
question about bclievabilhy is asked before plaintiffs conduct discovery. A plaintiff may need 
facts that are "in the hands (or minds) of defendants and third pnrtics" in order to successrully 
satisfy the plausibility standard, but how is the plaintiff to discover those facts1 Scott Dodson, 
Federal Pleading and State Pre.suit Discovery, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 43, 44 (2010). 
79. See Brunet, supra note 58, at 10. 
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ment based upon the existence of factual inferences into a new legal 
rule."80 In other words, the permissibility of certain facts is a question 
of law, not of fact. 
If that is what the Court did in Dukes, then perhaps the decision 
says less about future class actions and more about employment dis-
crimination cases and other cases that involve difficult questions of 
motive or causation. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
A. For Employment Discrimination 
Clearly, Dukes came down to the size and complexity of both Wal-
Mart's operation and the potential class. First, a majority of the Court 
simply did not believe that all of the class members could possibly be 
injured in the same way given the multitude of decision makers at 
issue-even for the disparate impact claim, which did not require in-
tent. Second, a majority of the Court did not seem to believe that 
causation, her~ that the plaintiffs' sex caused them to receive lower 
pay and fewer promotions, can ever be proven by statistical analysis, 
as a matter of law. Statistical proof of causation is used not just in 
employment discrimination cases, but in other areas of law as well. 
Causation is demonstrated by sophisticated statistical analysis in med-
ical malpractice cases,81 toxic torts,82 and antitrust cases,83 to name a 
few additional situations. More importantly, at least in employment 
discrimination cases, the Dukes majority did not seem to think that 
this type of bias can form the basis for a disparate treatment case. 
Central to its reasoning is the statement by the majority that "left to 
their own devices most managers in any corporation-and surely most 
managers in a corporation that forbids sex discrimination-would se-
lect sex-neutral, performance-based criteria for hiring and promotion 
that produce no actionable disparity at all."84 This statement reflects 
a number of important assumptions. First, it shows that the majority 
has a particular view of how people make decisions and what influ-
ences those decisions. Second, it shows that the majority has a defini-
80. Id. 
81. See, e.g., Alex Stein, Toward a T11eory of Mtdica/ Malpracrice, 97 lowA L. REv. 1201, 
1222-23 (2012) (discussing proof or malpractice by differential etiology-a study of probabilicy). 
82. See gtnerally Steve Gold, Ca11salion in Toxic Torts: Burdens of Proof, Slandards of Per· 
suasion, and Statistical Evidence, 96 YALE LJ. 376 (1986) (describing how statistics are used in 
toxic torts cases). 
83. See generally Hanns A. Abele el al., Proving Causation in Privale Anriuust Cases, 7 J. 
CoMrETmoN L. & EcoN. 847 (2011) (discussing sophisticated statistical techniques used to 
prove causation in tort law related to antitrust cases). 
84. Wal-Mart Stores, Jnc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2554 (2011). 
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tion of discrimination that limits liability to human actors and bases 
that liability on the Justices' views of the decision·making process. 
And finally, though couched in language of neutrality, it shows that 
the Justices in the Dukes majority fundamentally believe that their 
judgments about the world are more reliable than those of other 
judges or social scientists. 
I. The Justices on Human Decision Making 
The Justices seem to believe that people make decisions in a fairly 
rigorous, logical, and self-aware way-that people are rational actors. 
Rational actors recognize that they must pick some course of action 
from a set of potential actions, define the minimum criteria necessary 
for consideration of a course of action, define further criteria that 
would make a course of action more or less desirable based on a fixed 
ideal, and weigh the costs and benefits of alternatives.85 Even when 
people make snap judgments, common wisdom holds that decisions 
are caused by reasons and that the decision maker knows what those 
reasons are.86 To the extent that the rational actor model is envi· 
sioned by the Dukes majority as a description of behavior rather than 
an ideal for behavior-a fact rather than an aspiration-it is capable 
of empirical testing and, actually, has been the subject of significant 
empirical research in the last several decades. 87 
Yet, while the Dukes majority might agree that facts are capable of 
empirical testing, it seems not to countenance the notion that the 
human decision making process is that kind of fact because it rejected 
the testimony of sociologist Dr. William Bielby. Perhaps the Justices 
think that decisions are caused by thoughts and, because thoughts oc· 
cur in the brain of an individual and cannot be seen, individual reason 
85. Ste gtneTa/ly DAllllEL KAHNEM/\N, TtttNKINO, FAST ANO SLow 20 (2011); JAMES G. 
MARCH WITTI CHIP HEATH, A PRIMER ON DECISION MAKINO: How DECISIOl'IS HAPPEN 1-5 
(1994). 
86. Ste KAHNEMAN, supra note SS, al 4 ("You believe you know what goes on in your mind, 
which ohen consists of one conscious thought leading in an orderly way to another."); id. at 8 
("Social scientists in the 1970s broadly accepted two ideas obout human nature. First, people are 
generally rational, and their thinkinr; is normally sound. Second, emotions such as fear, aCCcc· 
tion, and hatred explain most of the occasions on which people depart from rationality."); id. ot 9 
(exploining how includin& lhe questions Crom studies in articles allowed readers to see Raws in 
their own thinking that they had not realized they Cell prey to). 
87. The field of cognitive psychology was created to study how people think. It was founded 
as a discipline by Ulric Neisser in the late 1960s. Set Douglas Martin, Ulric Ntisstr is Dtad at 81: 
Rtshaped Study of tht Mind, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2012, at A20. For more information on the 
studies of liuman cognition, see KAHNEMAN, s11pra note 85 (describing and citing hundreds of 
studies); DANIEL M. WEONE1t, THE lu.us10111 OF C0Nsc1ous W1LL (2003) (explaining that the 
sense people have of free will is sometimes illusory); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, J11d1· 
ment Under Unctrlainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 Sc i. 1124 (1974). 
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is an appropriate tool to assess that process. Perhaps the Justices in 
the Dukes majority did not believe that the social sciences that study 
and test human decision making can really measure or assess that de-
cision making because the process cannot be seen or touched. In 
other words. they may believe that their own introspection and rea-
soning is a better tool than any social science method. 
While not all scientists agree on every detail. there is a remarkable 
amount of consensus among cognitive psychologists, those who study 
the mental processes of "memory. perception, learning. thinking, rea-
soning. language. and understanding. "88 that the rational actor model 
is not in fact an accurate description of how people think or make 
decisions. Instead, our intuitions. impressions. and decisions often 
take place without us knowing how they entered into our conscious 
experience.89 When we are confronted with a problem. the answer 
that comes to mind might not be the answer to the original question. 
like "will this person be a good worker?"; rather, it may be an answer 
to an easier and related question, such as "Have I seen many others 
like this person be good workers?"90 Cognitive psychologists have 
shown the way that both cognitive structures and shortcuts in reason-
ing influence judgment and shape intuition, "biasing in predictable 
ways the perception, interpretation. encoding. retention, and recall of 
information about other people.''9t 
This research suggests that conventional wisdom about what it 
means to discriminate. "because or' an individual's identity character-
istic may be too narrow if it limits liability to incidents of fully self· 
aware prejudice.92 Neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has de-
fined discrimination. although the Court has colloquially referred to 
88. Rov l.ACHMAN irr Al.., CooNmve PsvCH01.oov -"ND INFORMATION PRoc£SS1No 6 
(1979) (defining the field of cognitive psychology). According to the authors, the field is domi· 
nated by information processing study, 
defined ... as the way man collects, stores, modifies, and interprets environmental 
information or information already stored internally. [Those who study information 
processing] are interested in knowin& how he adds information to his permanent 
knowledge of the world, how he accesses it again, and how he uses his knowledge in 
every facet of human activity. 
Id. al 7. 
89. Sec K-"llNEMAN, supra note 85, at 4. 
90. Sec id. at 15. 
91. Linda Hamihon Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach 10 
Discrimination and Equal Opport1mity, 41 STAN. EM!'. L. Rev. 1161, 1188 (1995). See generally 
KAHNEMAN, supra note 85, at 109-95, 267-74 (describing the kinds of biases to which we tend to 
be subject). 
92. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000c·2(a) (2006) ("It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer .. . to discriminate against any individual . .. because of such individual's race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin."). 
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one kind of discrimination as "intentional disparate treatment."93 
Moreover, the Court has never definitively required that an actor be 
fully self-aware of the reasons for his or her decision.94 Thus, there is 
room for evolution in the meaning of discrimination as the state of 
science regarding how people make decisions continues to advance. 
Admittedly, there are some serious disputes about the state of that 
science, but they are predominantly between lawyers rather than ex-
perts within the scientific community. For example, Laurens Walker 
and John Monahan wrote an article i"n 1987 that described the use of 
social science evidence as giving fact-finders "information about the 
social and psychological context in which contested adjudicative facts 
occurred" in order to "help the [fact-finder] interpret" them.9.s Other 
scholars have urged the courts to consider social science in assessing 
what constitutes discrimination.96 When Dr. Bielby and Dr. Susan 
Fiske sought to testify on behalf of plaintiffs in gender discrimination 
suits about how the decision-making structures of the defendant com-
panies allowed decision makers to rely on sex stereotyping in making 
decisions,97 Professors Walker and Monahan argued that such expert 
evidence should not be allowed to link what is true about society gen-
erally to specific practices within an employer.98 Professors Melissa 
Hart and Paul Secunda challenged this change of heart by Walker and 
Monahan, arguing that such evidence was properly admitted and, fur-
ther, that the resistance to it was an argument about what it means to 
discriminate.99 
The Court rejected Dr. Bielby's testimony, just as Professors 
Monahan and Walker urged it to do.100 In doing so, the Court did not 
93. ~e. e.g., U.S. Postal Scrv. Bd. of Governors v. Aiken, 460 U.S. 711, 71S-16 (l983); Pull· 
man-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288-90 (1982); Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affain v. Burdine, 
450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981); furnco Cons1r. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 580 (1978). 
94. See D. Don Welch, Removing Discriminatory Barriers: Basing Disparate Treatment Analy· 
~is un Mutive Ruthitr thun Intent, 60 S. CAL l . REV. 733, 766 (1987). 
95. ~e Neil J. Vidmar & Regina A. Schuller, Juries and Expert Evidence: Social Framework 
Testimony, l.Aw & CoNTEMP. PRoes., Autumn 1989, at 133, 133 (citing Laurens Walker & John 
Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New Use of Social Sciencein /Aw, 73 VA. L. REv. SS9 (1987)). 
96. See, e.g., Symposium, Behavioral Realism, 94 CALIF. L. REv. 945 (2006); Krieger, supra 
note 91, at 1161 ; Joan C. Williams ct Nancy Segal, Beyond the MtUemal Wall: Relit/ for Family 
Caregivers Who Are Discriminated Against on the Job, 26 HARV. W°"m"'s LJ. 77, 80 (2003). 
97. See William T. Bielby, Can I Get a Witness?: Challenges of Using Expert Testimony on 
Cognitive Bias in Employment Discrimination Litigation, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. PoL'Y J. 377, 
387-90, 395 {2003) (describing the testimony). 
98. ~e John Monahan et al., Context11al Evidence of Gender Discrimination: The Ascendance 
of "Social Frameworks", 94 VA. l . REV. 1715, 1719 (2008). 
99. Melissa Hart & Paul M. Secunda, A Matter of Context: Social Framework Evidence in 
Employment Discrimination Class Actions, 78 FoRoHAM L. REv. 37, 39-41 (2009). 
100. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2SS3-S4 (2011). 
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explain its position as a refinement of employment discrimination law. 
Yet, because it seemed to rely on a notion of plausibility and because 
it framed the discussion about the evidence on implicit bias as insuffi-
ciently linked to the individual decision makers at Wal-Mart, the 
Court's holding will likely be interpreted to limit what constitutes em-
ployment discrimination. 
2. The Justices on the Law of Discrimination 
I have argued elsewhere that the Supreme Court no longer appears 
to believe in a core principle found in the early discrimination cases-
that discrimination exists frequently enough that, absent some other 
explanation, it is reasonable to infer that discrimination caused an em-
ployer to take an adverse employment action against an employee.10 1 
Implicit bias evidence provides contextual support for the background 
belief necessary to those early cases. It is one step in a chain of infer-
ences that the trier of fact must take to reach a conclusion of discrimi-
nation. It sets the stage to illustrate how people in the aggregate tend 
to behave when making decisions and how stereotypes play a role in 
those decisions. The Court implicitly rejected even that limited role, 
however, by rejecting Dr. Bielby's testimony.102 
Thus, it seems that the Court has adopted a view about what it 
means to discriminate that makes background facts about discrimina-
tion irrelevant to questions about employer liability. Consider the 
work of Professor Richard Nagar~da, work that the Court relied on 
heavily, which described what the courts must do in applying Rule 
23(b )(2) in factual terms: 
Class certification is not a matter of mere pleading but, rather, of 
affirmative proof that the requirements stated in Rule 23 have been 
satisfied. The court must make a "definitive assessment" that these 
requirements have been met, even if that assessment entails the res-
olution of conflicting proof and happens to overlap with an issue-
even a critical one-on the merits.103 
Professor Nagareda characterized the standard the district court must 
use as "the usual preponderance standard, not the standard for a mo-
tion to dismiss, for admissibility under Daubert, or for trial-worthiness 
101. See Marcia L. McCormick, Disparare Impact and Equal Protection After Ricci v. DeS1c£· 
ano, 27 Wis. J.L. GENDER & Soc'v 100 (2012); see also Katie R. Eyer, That's Not Discrimina· 
tion: American Beliefs and rhe Limits of Anti-Discrimination Law, 96 M INN. L Rev. 1275, 
1278-79 (2012); Cheryl I. Harris &. Kimberly West·Faulcon, Reading Ricci: Whitening Discrimi· 
nation, Racing Tes1 Fairness, 58 UCLA L Rev. 73, 118, 143 (2010). 
102. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 147-49 (2000). 
103. Richard A. Nagareda, Class Cmification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. 
Rev. 97, 100 (2009) (citations omitted). 
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as a matter for summary judgment."104 At another point in the same 
article, however, he described the certification question as a "mixed 
question of fact and law."105 Eventually, Professor Nagareda con-
cluded that in Dukes, the issue of whether the class had common ques-
tions that predominated over individual ones was really a question of 
law.•06 By adopting Professor Nagareda's analysis, then, the Court 
may have agreed that it was deciding a question of law. 
The Court did not explain, however, that it was deciding what dis-
crimination meant as a legal matter. Yet .when the Court adopted 
Professor Nagareda's analysis, it also adopted his reasoning on the law 
of discrimination. Professor Nagareda was not an employment dis-
crimination scholar, however, and his reasoning did not accurately 
capture the law of Title VII. He seemed to assert that any time a 
pattern of discrimination fell short of almost total segregation on the 
basis of a protected class, no inference of disparate treatment could be 
drawn.107 He classified the plaintiffs' theory as one of "structural" dis-
crimination because it relied in part on evidence about implicit bias 
and sex stereotyping.108 He then concluded that the underlying dis-
pute was about the definition of discrimination and thus subject to de 
novo review.'09 This conflation of sex stereotyping and structural dis-
crimination is simply incorrect. The law on sex stereotyping is more 
nuanced and more thoroughly recognized as a form of discrimination 
prohibited by Title VII than Professor Nagareda acknowledged.110 
Moreover, his reasoning failed to consider disparate impact, the other 
theory of discrimination raised by the plaintiffs. Thus, the Court, at 
least implicitly, changed the law by rejecting a definition of discrimi-
nation that considered evidence of implicit bias. 
Notably, the implicit bias evidence was not the only evidence that 
decision makers at Wal-Mart were engaging in a pattern and practice 
of discrimination. Plaintiffs also provided sophisticated evidence of a 
104. Id. at 129 (citation omitted). 
105. Id. at 114 (internal quotation marks omiucd). 
106. See id. at 159. 
107. See id. at 155. 
108. Id. at 158-59. 
109. Nagareda, supro note 103, at 159. 
110. See, e.g., Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003) (explaining how ste· 
reotypes about women and caregiving worked to keep women out or the workplace); Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (recognizing that sex stereotyping is disparate treat· 
mcnt sex discrimination); Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988) (concluding 
that wholly subjective promotion standards could allow decision makers to use racial stereo· 
types); Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 284-90, 285 n.17 (1987) (explaining 
that stereotypes about pregnant workers would be disparate treatment and inconsistent with the 
goals or Title VH). 
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gender pay gap within and across stores, regions, and positions, in-
cluding proof that the gap was not caused by neutral factors. Further, 
the plaintiffs provided evidence that the gender promotion gap was 
significant compared to Wal-Mart's competitors, and that the gap 
could not be due to chance. Three key pieces of expert evidence ex-
isted: (1) discrimination can thrive where complete discretion is left to 
decision makers steeped in a common culture that contained stereo-
typed views of women; (2) women were systematically underpaid and 
this underpayment was caused by their sex; and (3) women were sys-
tematically under-promoted and that under-promotion was not caused 
by chance.111 Taking expert evidence combined with the anecdotal 
evidence, a rational fact-finder could conclude that the pay and pro-
motion gaps were the result of sex-based discrimination, and that the 
pattern affected all women to some extent. 
Going forward, the decision in Dukes will stand for the principle 
that only decisions made with the fully self-aware goal of penalizing a 
person because of her sex, race, or other protected status is discrimi-
nation under Title VII. Additionally, the decision will likely be used 
to argue that statistical regression analysis, a technique designed to 
test causation, cannot be used to prove whether a state of mind caused 
an effect. 
B. For Other Kinds of Cases 
As the prior Part suggests, the greatest impact of Dukes, both sub-
stantively and procedurally, will undoubtedly be on class action em-
ployment discrimination cases, whether they are disparate treatment 
or disparate impact cases. Additionally, there will be both procedural 
and substantive ramifications for other kinds of cases. 
In procedural terms, the dissimilarities approach, which is now a 
part of the Rule 23(a)(2) commonality inquiry, will prove an espe-
cially high hurdle in cases that present facts that conflict with judges' 
worldview. It was evident in this case, as it has been in many other 
employment discrimination cases at every level of court, that the ma-
jority of judges do not believe that employment discrimination occurs 
very often. And it was this worldview that prompted the majority to 
find the claims of commonality essentially implausible. For other legal 
wrongs that courts find unlikely to occur, like the antitrust claim in 
Twombly and the civil rights claim in Iqbal, the chances of framing a 
successful class action seem very slim. 
111. Set Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2549 (2011). 
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Similarly, in cases that involve complex questions of causation, such 
as toxic torts or environmental injuries, or actions by or motives of 
multiple people, or in cases in which effects or injuries vary signifi-
cantly among members of the putative class, plaintiffs will likely have 
a difficult time proceeding as a class. Each of these types of classes 
involves enough complexity and potential dissimilarity that they are 
analogous to the type of class proposed in Dukes. 
That is not where the similarity ends, though. The Dukes decision 
suggests that a majority of justices on the Court do not believe that 
statistical analysis, even regression or other similarly sophisticated 
types of analyses that show very tight correlations and control for mul-
tiple variables, are useful in building a case. The majority employed 
the same form of slicing and dicing of the evidence-looking at each 
piece in isolation and requiring that piece alone to conclusively prove 
the plaintiff class's commonality-that courts often use in employ-
ment cases.112 In fact, the Court seemed to dismiss the statistical evi-
dence as less valid than any other kind of evidence.113 As a 
substantive matter, suspicion of statistical evidence will prove prob-
lematic for the wide range of cases that might typically rely on it-
complex financial or tax cases, antitrust cases, voting rights cases, pat-
ent infringement cases, real estate cases, and a variety of tort cases, for 
example. Finally, as a substantive matter, the suspicion of social sci-
ence evidence will have ramifications in essentially any type of case in 
which liability depends upon a person's state of mind. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Although the Dukes decision made structural litigation, class ac-
tions of all types, and individual civil rights claims more difficult, 
lower courts have begun fleshing out rules that do not completely 
foreclose these types of cases. Litigators should take note of these 
trends. Generally, classes more limited in the number of members, in 
actors who caused the injuries, and in geographic area of injury (not 
112. See Michael J. Zimmer, Slicing and Dicing of Individual DiSparate Trtatment law, 61 LA. 
L R£v. S11, SSS, 592 (200l);sualso Marcia L. McCormick, The Allurtand Danger of Practicing 
Low as Ta.ronomy, 58 ARK. L. Rev. 159, 183-84 (2005). · 
113. The Court has had an uneasy relationship with statislics. Ste, e.g., McCleskcy v. Kemp, 
481 U.S. 279 (1987) (holding lhal a statistical sludy, which showed black derendanu who killed 
white victims were rour limes more likely to get lhe death penalty than white dcrendants who 
killed black victims, was nol enough to show discrimination); S1ewart J. Schwab & S1even L. 
Willborn, The Story of Hazelwood: Employmtnt Discrimination by the Numbers, in EMPLOY· 
MENT D1sCRIMINATION STORIES 48, 63 (Joel Wm. Friedman ed., 2006) (describing the Court's 
ambivalence abou1 statistical analysis in a pattern and practice employment discrimination case). 
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nationwide) are more likely to be successful.114 This was the lesson 
that the attorneys who represented the plaintiff class learned from 
Dukes. They filed two regional class actions to replace the initial, na-
tionwide claim: one in the Texas region, and the other in the Califor-
nia region.11s 
There are additional important lessons. How the injury and its 
cause are framed matters greatly. The easiest case for certifying a 
class would be a situation in which a single wrong harms a significant 
number of people.116 Thus, when the injury can be framed as caused 
by a single source, like municipal liability cases in which a pattern of 
actions might be framed in terms of an institutional entity's policy or 
custom, commonality will be easier to demonstrate. tt7 In such a case, 
the injury would be framed as the risk of a more specific injury, a risk 
shared equally by all members of a class subject to the actions of that 
institutional entity. ne 
A court may not accept that frame, however, and, especially if many 
members of the class were injured in different ways, may still focus on 
the different injuries caused by the system that is alleged to have been 
a policy or a practice.119 In other words, when the injury is viewed as 
l 14. Su, e.g .. Connor B. v. Patrick, 278 F.R.D. 30, 33 (D. Mass. 2011) (refusing 10 decertify a 
class of all children in lhe custody of the Massachusetts Stale Departmenl of Children and Fami· 
lies because the class was nol too expansive and each class member was subject 10 lhe risk of 
harm identified in the complaint). 
115. See Attention Present and Former Female Employees of Wal·Mart or Sam's Club in the 
United States, WAt.·MART Ct.Ass WEBSITE, htlp://www.walmartclass.com/public_home.html (last 
visited Jan. 23, 2013); see also Plaintiffs' First Amended Complainc and Jury Demand, Odle v. 
Wal·Mart Stores, Inc. (N.D. Tex. Jan. 19, 2012) (No. 3:11-cv-02954), available al http://www. 
walmartclass.com/stalicdata/l0%20Pl's%20Amend. %20Complaint %201·l9· 12.pdr; Plaintiffs' 
Fourth Amended Complaint, Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (N.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2011) (No. C· 
01·2253·CRB), available at ht1p://www.walmartclass.com/stalicdata/Four1h%20Amcnded%20 
complaint%20final%20with%20exhiblts.pd(. 
116. See, e.g., Sullivan v. DB lnvs .. Inc., 667 F.3d 273, 318 (3d Cir. 2011) (en bane) (refusing lo 
decertify a class of purchasers that bought from a single wholesaler who aUcgedly controlled 
enough of the diamond market to violate antitrust laws because anlilrust activities similarly in· 
jured members of the class by driving up prices); Gray v. Hearst Commc'ns., Inc., 444 Fed. App'x 
698, 700-02 (4th Cir. 2011) (arfirming certification when members of a class of advertisers were 
similarly injured by misrepresentations in uniform contracts thal were used by defendant with 
each member of the class); Conn. Retirement Plans & Trust Funds v. Amgen Inc., 660 F.3d 1170, 
1172 (9th Cir. 2011) (allowing a shareholder class action focused on the fraud on the market 
theory lo prcccd). 
117. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). 
118. See, e.g .. Stinson v. Cily or New York, No. 10 Civ. 4228 (RWS), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
100634, at •5-7 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 2012). 
119. M.D. v. Perry, 675 F.Jd 832, 841-43 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding that even though children in 
custody of Texas Permanent Managing Conscrvalorship were all subjecl to the alleged constitu· 
tional deficiencies within the Conscrvatorship, they were all injured in different ways such that al 
least some claims required assessing whether the conduct al issue shocked the conscience); Jamie 
S. v. Milwaukee Pub. Schs .. 668 F.3d 481, 496-98 (71h Cir. 2012) (rejecting cerlification of a class 
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having been caused by multiple discrete decisions by multiple decision 
makers, or any other similar series of events, it will be difficult to cer-
tify a class.120 Conversely, if the plaintiff class can prove how specific 
practices work together to cause a single injury, the class has a better 
chance of being sustained.121 Hence, there is significant room for 
framing and advocacy by lawyers. 
The challenge in employment discrimination cases may be signifi-
cantly greater. The majority of the Court seems to have rejected not 
only the underlying premises of the employment discrimination cause 
of action, but also many of the tools that, together, might persuade a 
fact-finder that what has happened in an employment situation is dis-
crimination. The idea of discrimination as disparate treatment has 
narrowed, the idea of discrimination as disparate impact seems to 
have disappeared entirely, and the method of looking at the evidence 
seems to have been further restricted. Numerous prior cases have 
been called into question, seemingly overruled without the Court's ac-
knowledgement that it was doing so, or "stealth overruled. "t22 Two 
examples are Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A.,t23 which held that courts 
should interpret allegations of discrimination liberally, and Reeves v. 
Sanderson Plumbing Products,t24 which held that evidence in a dis-
crimination case should be viewed holistically rather than each piece 
in isolation. 
Perhaps this challenge means that it is time to change tactics and 
move away from litigation.125 Advocates for change may need to de-
under the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act when the inquiry at issue was child 
specific). 
120. Set, e.g., Bolden v. Walsh Constr. Co., 688 F.3d 893. 894-96 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding thot 
discrimination that allegedly took place across multiple sites or an employer could not be ccrti· 
ficd because the injury depended on all supervisors being motivated the same way, which would 
be nearly impossible 10 prove); Bennet v. Nucor Corp., 656 F.3d 802, 813-16 (8th Cir. 2011) 
(holding that because different parts or a single plant had different supervision and policies, a 
class of about 100 black employees lacked commonality); Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 657 
F.3d 970, 987-88 (9th Cir. 2011) (reversing and remanding certification in response to Dukes, 
suggesting that if decisions are made in a decentralized way, a class will not be certifiable). 
121. See, e.g., McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482, 491-92 
(7th Cir. 2012) (reversing the denial or class certification when plaintiffs specifically demon· 
strated how a practice operated to cause a disparate impact on members of a class, which indi· 
cated that the claim was most efficiently addressed on a classwide basis). 
122. Set Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth Overruling (with Particular Attention to Mi· 
randa v. Arizona), 99 GEo. LJ. l , S (2010) (noting that the Courl has interpreling cases so as to 
eviscerate their effects). 
123. Set Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002). 
124. Set Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000). 
125. This is a common exhortation in my scholarship. Set, e.g., Marcia L. McCormick. 
Deco11pling Employment, 16 LEwrs & Cv.1tK L. REv. 499 (2012) (advocating for policymakers 
to stop using the employment relationship to distribute social goods so that there would be less 
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velop new strategies to persuade the public to support change through 
social media, through a change in the law, or through change on the 
ground by demanding, as consumers and employees, that businesses 
conform their practices to change the way they operate in order to 
prevent discriminatory practices that systematically disadvantage his-
torically disadvantaged groups. If the "Wal-Mart Effect" has trans-
formed the American economy,126 just imagine the impact that the 
Wal-Mart Customer Effect could have. 
at stake in that relationship likely to trigger unconscious or conscious biases); Marcia L. McCor· 
mick, Consensus, Disstnsus, and Enforcement: Legal Protection of Working Women from the 
Time of the Triangle Shirtwaist Factory Fire 10 Today, N.Y.U. J. LEO. & Pus. PoL'Y 645, 647 
(2011) (arguing that the lack of consensus on discrimination dooms enforcement and change); 
Marcia L. McCormick, Federal Regulation and tht Problem of Adjudication, 56 ST. Louis U. LJ. 
39, 43 (2011) (exploring constitutional limitations on an agency designed to adjudicate discrimi· 
nation claims); Marcia L. McCormick, Tht T1u1h Is Out Thtre: Revamping Federal Antidis· 
crimination Enforctmtnt for tht Twtnly·first Century, 30 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAe. L. 193 
(2009) (advocating a truth commission model to explore the state of the nation's workplaces); 
Marcia L McCormick, Tht Equality Parodist: Parado:£ts of tht Law's Power to Advance Eq"a/. 
ity, 13 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 515. 516-17 (2007) (arguing that the structures or law in the 
United States are not good at producing change). 
126. Set CHARLES FISHMAN, TH& WAL·MART EFFECT 4-5, 246-47 (2006). 
